This study examines how firm level contracting capabilities and institutions shape entrepreneurial firm?s governance decisions related to growth (insourcing vs. outsourcing). By integrating Transaction Costs, Resource Based View and New Institutional economics theories we illuminate the relevance of contracting capabilities and institutional distance in shaping buy vs. make decisions. Combining three different datasets we create a panel that includes 469 domestic and foreign startups participating of an international acceleration program. After analyzing 705 meetings and 2,118 governance decisions we find that institutional distance and contracting capabilities encourage startups? outsourcing. As a growth strategy, outsourcing allows startups to mitigate transaction and bureaucratic costs. Interestingly, we found that compared to domestic firms, foreign firms facing greater institutional distance rely on outsourcing strategies only to certain extent; once they have outsourced a handful of times hiring seems a suitable option for foreign firms. Our findings suggest that beyond the transaction level of analysis, firm and country level characteristics are relevant predictors of governance decisions, and that capabilities and institutions deserve additional consideration in the study of firm?s strategic choices related to growth.
INTRODUCTION
What shapes a firm's growth strategic choices? One of the most fundamental questions in the field of strategy has to do with firm's governance decisions. Among many decisions firms need to make, governance choices (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 , such as outsourcing or insourcing decisions (e.g. buy or make) are key, because organizing activities internally (integrating activities within a firm) and externally (externalizing activities by using the market) are two alternative strategic choices that have been found to shape firm's performance (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002) and accumulation of resources to develop competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989) .
From a practical stand point, the relevance of outsourcing decisions has increased in recent years given the geographical and technological dispersion of knowledge (Leiblein et al., 2002; Teece, 1992) and the quick pace of technological change that new firms face. Responding to the fast paced environmental trends for growth, outsourcing practices have grown explosively (Bertrand, 2011; Bertrand & Mol, 2013) , becoming one of the most popular ways firms disaggregate activities (Jensen & Petersen, 2013; Leiblein et al., 2002; Mol & Brewster, 2013 ).
Here we define insourcing as "the decision to hire an employee that becomes part of the company's personnel", and outsourcing as "the procurement of activities from independent suppliers" (Bertrand & Mol, 2013: 751) . Startups in particular increasingly use outsourcing (Hitt, Ireland, & Lee, 2000; Terjesen & Bhalla, 2009 ) to perform non-core supporting activities.
Outsourcing helps startup companies face initial resource limitations and capability barriers (Bhalla & Terjesen, 2013) such as scarcity of talent, and limited operational know how. For To test our hypotheses, we use data from the population of startups that participated in a
Chilean government-run international acceleration program over the period [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . Similar to many acceleration programs, this accelerator provides funding and a six month long cooperative group-like experience for an international cohort of entrepreneurs. Up to March 2014, about 900 startups have joined the program and moved into Chile. Because we are interested in the nature of growth decisions, we consider only those firms that have performed outsourcing or insourcing decisions during the six months that the program lasts. Our final sample corresponds to 469 startups from 51 countries that held 705 meetings and executed 2,118 governance decisions related to insourcing and outsourcing over the six-month period in which they were located in Chile.
This research contributes in several ways. First, it contributes to strategy by expanding the understanding of the drivers of governance decisions. Here we explore an overlooked type of cost that might affect firm boundary choices, that is the cost of resource commitment. While we agree with other authors in that institutional distance may shape transaction costs, we add that bureaucratic costs also deserve consideration when evaluating the effect of institutional distance in governance decisions. We suggest that institutional distance shapes the assessment of transaction and bureaucratic costs, and ultimately influences startups' governance structure decisions. Particularly, this study contributes to international business and global strategy by exploring the effect of institutional distance on governance decisions. Second, we contribute to RBV by explaining how firm level variation shapes firms' strategic choices related to
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Outsourcing Decisions ! ! '! governance. Specifically, we show how contracting capability development determines optimal governance choices by shaping firms' cost assessment. Hence, we expand beyond TCE tenets, and argue that it is not only the characteristic of the transaction, but also differences across firms, that shape firm growth. Third, we respond to the call made by a number of authors (Mayer & Salomon, 2006; Meyer et al., 2009; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008) to utilize an integrative perspective that includes transaction, firm, and environment level variables to explain governance decisions. Specifically, we contribute to the institution based view of business (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2009 ) by including institutions as a central lever of strategic choices related to growth. Fourth, we shed new light into the unexplored and novel context of entrepreneurial startups that have participated of an accelerator program. Whereas the studies on outsourcing decisions related to new firms' operating in highly dynamic environments are scant (for an exception, see Bhalla & Terjesen, 2013) , studies on startups that have been through accelerator programs are in their nascent stages (Cohen & Bingham, 2013) . Because accelerated firms are a growing phenomena, understanding the drivers for their strategic decisions related to growth matters. Finally, we offer relevant implications for practice, theory and future research.
In the following sections we elaborate our hypotheses based on existing theory, considering the three theoretical perspectives mentioned above and their corresponding interactions. Then, we introduce the specific entrepreneurial context in which our study takes place, followed by the data, variables and models, and empirical analysis of our study. Next, we address our main results, and finally we close with a discussion of our main findings, contributions and limitations of the present study. increasing transaction costs and decreasing market efficiency (Soto, 2007) . Country level institutions are relevant for governance decisions because they can lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) and minimize the costs of committing resources by creating an environment where transaction parties can interact free from the risk of contractual hazards and opportunism.
Because institutions influence the costs of alternative organizational forms (Williamson, 1985) ADD KHANAAND PALEPU , they have important explanatory power for governance decisions, being widely used to explain a number of them, such as entry mode, diversification strategies , and ownership structures. Whereas national level institutions have been used to explain particular business strategies (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Meyer et al., 2009) , less attention has been devoted to studies that consider institutional factors as drivers for outsourcing decisions. As an economic phenomenon, All in all, these authors show that a stricter set of labor (e.g. employment security laws) and tax law institutions increase the costs related to internalizing (i.e. hiring employees), by making employee termination costly and difficult; consequently shifting the parameters that otherwise would have suggested vertical integration as a preferred governance structure. Mol and Brewster (2013) argue that firms outsourcing decisions are also driven by costs of search and evaluation, which are higher when firms have limited access to an ample supply base. They find that local and foreign firms outsource less than multinational firms, but their hypotheses predicting that firms facing larger cross-cultural distance outsource less were not fully supported. Here, we offer an alternative explanation to their findings. Overall, the limited number of studies addressing institutions and outsourcing show that the institutional framework can influence outsourcing decisions. Building on previous research, in this study we aim to unravel the specific mechanism by which institutional distance and capabilities shape outsourcing decisions.
Costs of Resource Commitment, Institutional Distance and Governance Decisions
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests that governance decisions are a result of comparing transaction costs to bureaucratic costs (Coase, 1937; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 . Among the number of costs that a firm needs to face, here we emphasize the importance of an overlooked type of bureaucratic cost, the cost of (Folta, 1998; Williamson, 1985) . The costs of resource commitment are a particularly relevant for 1) new firms (Folta, 1998) , and firms that move into new markets (Delios & Henisz, 2000) ; 2) firms in technological subfield (Folta, 1998); 3) firms in domains where "pure equilibrium contracting" (Williamson, 1991) does not fully apply; 4) firms facing high levels of exogenous uncertainty. Different from transaction costs, the bureaucratic cost of resource commitment can make using the market more attractive. The costs of resource commitment are usually assessed against the needs for administrative control (Folta, 1998; Mody, 1993; Williamson, 1985 , 2006; Walker & Weber, 1984) , shapes firms' costs of resource commitment (Folta, 1998) .
Firms in industries facing higher levels of technological uncertainty are more prone to rely on flexible governance structures that allow them to switch partners with better capabilities (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986) , avoiding to be locked into a technology (Folta, 1998; Geyskens et al., 2006; Heide & John, 1990) . Based on these findings, we believe that in contrast & Zaheer, 1999) , and transference of organizational practices (Kostova, 1999) . In this paper we are particularly concerned with the regulative dimensions of institutional distance, and its implications for outsourcing decisions. Researchers (Davidson, 1980; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Luo, 2004) have suggested that institutional distance shapes entry choice for corporations that expand internationally. Transferring these findings to the world of international startups, here we suggest that startup firms facing greater levels of institutional distance may be more vulnerable to higher levels of environmental uncertainty, which can translate in higher transaction and bureaucratic cost structures. In this paper we argue that institutional distance not only increases transaction costs, but also increases the bureaucratic and internal coordination costs for a startup, such as the costs of resource commitment. A lack of understanding of the host country regulations makes outsourcing less costly than hiring, complementing the effect that institutional distance has on transaction costs.
We agree with TCE researchers (Geyskens et al., 2006) in that , in the absence of asset specificity, environmental uncertainty leads to flexible growth structures; we add that bureaucratic costs in the form of resource commitment costs may amplify this relationship. 
Dynamic Capabilities and Governance Decisions
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm builds on Penrose's (1959) ideas to explain firm's growth and heterogeneity among them. Building on these ideas, Nelson and Winter (1982) extend this theory by suggesting that beyond physical and human resources, firms also develop valuable organizational routines, also called capabilities (Teece & Pisano, 1997) . Capabilities are considered firm specific skills (Teece, 1981) that are usually hard to articulate and costly to transfer; invisible assets that firms develop and carry through their human capital (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) . Capabilities also relate to the productive efficiency of a firm, the more skilled and experienced it becomes, the more efficient it is in executing particular activities (Brahm & Tarziján, 2014) . They provide an answer to the question of how to achieve competitive advantages in contexts of fast technological change (Teece & Pisano, 1997) . Firm
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Outsourcing Decisions ! ! "#! capabilities are cumulative, developing over time as organizations perform these routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) . Capabilities affect firms' boundaries because as capabilities evolve, governance decisions are adjusted. Whereas many authors have studied how capabilities are a critical driver to explain differences in performance among firms (Barney, 1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982) , little attention has been devoted to explore how capabilities can also be a critical driver to explain governance decisions (Mayer & Salomon, 2006) . Only in recent years researchers have focused in this relationship (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Leiblein et al., 2002) , showing that capabilities shape governance decisions, and that this work can in fact complement the traditional transaction cost approach to governance.
Transaction Cost Economics theory portrays that transaction costs are a main driver for governance decisions. However, it does not consider that companies develop governance capabilities that can reduce the impact of transaction costs, and the costs of resource commitment. Governance decisions may not only be shaped by transaction costs, but also by firms' capabilities able to reduce these costs (Argyres, 1996) . Here, we refer to organizational capabilities, more than other type of resource based or technological capabilities. Organizational capabilities relate to organizational learning, and they can be relevant for strategic behavior (Gulati, 1999) . Organizational learning researchers (Levinthal & March, 1993) 
Institutions and Capabilities
In addition to studying how institutional distance shapes firms' growth, researchers have explored how capabilities developed through time and experience influence growth strategies. (Delios & Henisz, 2000) . The greater the difference between home and host country institutions, the higher the levels of environmental uncertainty experienced by a foreign firm, and the more urgent its need to economize in committing resources. In the same line of reasoning, developing the capabilities to reduce resource commitment may be especially important when the distance between home and host country institutions is large. Contracting capabilities reduce the threat of opportunism, and the ex post costs related to insourcing. Having developed contracting capabilities suggest more experience and more efficiency in executing a specific task (Brahm & Tarziján, 2014) .
Outsourcing, then, should be the preferred governance structure for a firm that has already developed these contracting capabilities. These skills become even more important for firms facing greater institutional distance. Foreign firms naturally face higher transaction costs than startups starting operations domestically, hence, developing contracting capabilities seems to be even more important for international firms. The interaction between institutions and capabilities sheds light to the institutional based view of business strategy (Peng, 2003) by providing a fined grain understanding of the relationship between institutions and capabilities in predicting governance strategies. Thus: Third, information on growth decisions was obtained through a database that recorded face-to-face reporting meetings that executives of the program maintained with each startup.
Once accepted into the accelerator program each startup team met at least one time with program executives to report their needs and achievements, it is from these meetings that we obtained insourcing and outsourcing decisions they made while in Chile. Funded and supervised by the program's advisors, these companies can either outsource or insource people to perform specific professional activities (e.g. marketing, design, technology development and sales) needed to grow. Since our dependent variable is the ratio of outsourcing, we removed from the sample all of those companies for which no growth was reported during the six months in which they were participating of the program. In addition to the sources of secondary data, we also met in several occasions with Startup Chile and CORFO officials to clarify questions and increase our confidence in the validity of our results.
Our final sample corresponds to 705 meetings and 469 startups in our full sample model, reporting 2,118 strategic decisions related to growth by insourcing and outsourcing (1,379 of them being outsourcing). In our sample, each company held between one and five meetings
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Outsourcing Decisions ! ! "*! during the six months that the program lasted, and the average number of meetings was 1.5. The firms in our sample belong to an ample range of developed and developing economies, whereas fifty one countries are present in the sample, especially representative (more than 40 firms) are startups coming from U.S, UK, Canada, India, Argentina, Brazil and Canada, beyond the Chilean firms that represent about 25% of the sample. Due to the international nature of our sample, it provides us with appropriate conditions to test how between and within firm, and country level factors shape startups' strategic choices for growth when deciding between outsourcing and insourcing.
Main Variables and Model
The analysis of our data explores how governance decisions (i.e. insourcing vs. 
Estimation Technique
The dataset has a time series and a cross section dimension, opening opportunities to obtain more precise estimates due to a larger sample size (i.e. lower standard errors), and also understand how certain effects, such as contracting capabilities, evolve over time. Panel data Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (xttest0 in STATA), we conclude that fixed effects is appropriate. However, given the structure of our data, this is not an option because we have time dependent covariates. The characteristics of our dataset poses two main violations of ordinary least square models (OLS). Since some of our independent and control variables are time variant, and that all observations are collected within a period of six months, we followed authors facing similar challenges (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2014; Patel & Chrisman, 2014; Philippe & Durand, 2011; Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014) , and chose feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) as an estimation technique that fits panel data linear models, and that can used when the dependent variable is a ratio (Berry, 2006) , and when the panels are unbalanced (Berry, 2006; Patel & Chrisman, 2014; Philippe & Durand, 2011) . This model is appropriate because it addresses potential autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity across panels (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010; Yang et al., 2014) . We tested our hypotheses using STATA 12; we incorporate commands that estimate even if observations are unequally spaced in time, which is our case.
RESULTS

Main Results
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Among the significant controls in Model 1, we observe that the negative sign for arrival stage indicates that startups that arrive into the program at later stages are less prone to outsource than startups in earlier stages. This is also confirmed by the negative term on business incorporation, signaling that startups that have not yet been incorporated are more prone to outsource than those that are properly registered. This behavior supports our statements arguing that outsourcing may be a preferred strategy for firms higher degrees of uncertainty, such as startups in earlier stages, when the cost of committing resources can determine the true existence of a company. This model also shows that firms whose team members do not speak Spanish are more prone to outsource than startups led by Spanish-speaking team members. We believe that not speaking the country language adds to institutional distance, making it even more important to keep a lower cost structure. The urgency to economize in resource commitment is even more important for firms that have no knowledge of the local language. In Model 2 we entered the variable Absolute Institutional Distance (AID). We found a positive and significant relationship (b=0.039, p< 0.01) between Absolute Institutional Distance and Outsourcing Ratio; this is, the larger the distance between home and host country institutions for a startup, the more prone it will be to outsource. The AID coefficient is also positive and significant in Model 4 (p<0.01).
Using STATA 12 we run the margins command and confirm that the effect of AID on outsourcing was significant at all levels of institutional distance, supporting Hypothesis 1 in that higher levels of institutional distance are positively related to higher levels of outsourcing. In Model 3 we Contracting Capabilities on Outsourcing Ratio (see Figure 1 ) for different levels of AID. Figure 1 illustrates that initially, as predicted, domestic startups (AID=1) outsource less than foreign startups (shown by a positive coefficient for all levels of AID, and a higher intercept for foreign startups, as seen in Figure 1 ). However, this trend is only sustainable until a startup has outsourced about six times (contracting capabilities (lagged) =5). The negative coefficient of the interaction shows that the slope for domestic startups is steeper than for foreign startups (the slope of the regression line for the domestic startups' group is 0.0984, which is the coefficient for capabilities). The negative interaction term, then, is the difference in slopes between the domestic and each of the foreign groups. As shown in Figure 1 , after having outsourced about six times, Chilean startups will be more prone to outsource than international startups facing institutional distance. Hypothesis 3, then, is only partially supported, or supported only until startups have outsourced about six times. This interesting result will be further addressed in the discussion section.
Additional Models and Robustness Checks
Aiming to confirm the robustness of our results we performed a number of sensitivity analyses. First, we ran our main model operationalizing the Absolute Institutional Distance (AID) variable as a continuous variable. The fact that this variable was not normally distributed only made our main effects smaller, yet the results remain the same in terms of significance and after outsourcing a handful of times, domestic firms are more prone to outsource than foreign firms. The explanation for this phenomenon would be the same as the one for the interaction in our main model, and will be addressed in the discussion section. Third, we conducted a number of robustness checks by running our main model by using different estimation procedures. For example, we replicated our FGLS analysis by using a XTREG, obtaining similar results to what we had for our main models. Additionally, we operationalized our dependent variable as a dummy variable (OUTS_binary) that assumed a value of 1 if the transaction j in time t reported that at least one individual was outsourced by the firm, and zero otherwise. This operationalization also kept our results consistent. Finally, we ran a Probit model, obtaining less sophisticated but very similar results.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis highlights the importance of going beyond TCE considerations to explain firms' growth choices; here we include firm and institution level considerations to find explanations to startups' outsourcing decisions. A strong support for Hypothesis 1 shows that when startups go international, institutional factors play a key role in shaping outsourcing decisions. We believe that greater distance creates disincentives to commit, increasing the value of delaying any type of activity that requires incurring in costs of committing resources.
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Irrespective of that the institutions in the home country are stronger or weaker than in Chile, facing greater levels of institutional distance suggest that firms would prefer a growth structure that delays costs when the value of bringing someone into the company is still uncertain.
Consequently, we found that outsourcing is the preferred growth strategy for startup firms facing larger levels of institutional distance. We also looked into firm level factors, such as contracting capabilities, and confirm that they also play a role in shaping outsourcing decisions. In line with organizational learning arguments (Levinthal & March, 1993) , our results show that firms that have relied on outsourcing as a growth strategy in the past seem more prone to lean towards it when bringing new personnel into the company. This tendency is common across domestic and foreign firms. We were initially puzzled by the negative sign of our interaction effect. However, a deeper analysis that included talking to program executive suggests that the moderating effect of contracting capabilities is different for domestic and international firms. Whereas foreign firms are more inclined to outsource than domestic firms, Chilean firms are more inclined to repeat the outsourcing behavior. It is not immediately obvious why international firms are less inclined to outsource after having outsourced a handful of times. Why would they not take advantage of the contracting capabilities they had developed? A possible explanation for this behavior can be related to the costs of search and evaluation suggested by Mol and Brewster (2013) . Whereas domestic companies have an advantage in terms of the network of trusted suppliers from which they can outsource, international startups moving to a new country face costs of searching and evaluating new suppliers in the host country. This is, contracting capabilities may be limited by the fact that they are embedded in a startups' home country, and are not easily transferable to a host country. We went ahead and communicated with program executives to confirm these results; they reaffirmed our findings and mentioned that foreign companies were in fact limited by their knowledge of local sources of outsourcing. Hiring locally, then, would be a strategy used by foreign firms to overcome some of these liabilities. To summarize, our results suggest that focusing exclusively on one of the dimensions that shape outsourcing decisions is too restrictive. Beyond transactions characteristics, we showed that country and firm level factors play a key role in determining the growth strategy for a startup firm. Specifically, our findings underscore the importance of taking into account a) institutional distance and its implications for transaction costs and costs of resource commitment, b) contracting capabilities as a mechanism able to reduce a startups' cost structure, and c) the interaction between capabilities and institutional distance, which trigger a different effect for domestic and international firms.
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we focused on the question of the boundaries of the firm in the context of growing technology startups. Consistent with extant research (Mol & Brewster, 2013; Rangan, 2000) , we argue that outsourcing decisions are driven by transaction cost considerations. The first contribution this article makes is to add that bureaucratic costs should also be taken into account in this cost assessment that precedes outsourcing decisions. The costs of committing resources early on in the life of a startup are as important as transaction costs; this article expands the understanding of the costs of resource commitment (Folta, 1998; Luo, 2004; Williamson, 1985) by bringing up new determinants that shape this overlooked type of cost.
Looking into what are the mechanisms that drive these costs is part of our second contribution.
In line with other authors promoting an integrative perspective in strategy (Mayer & Salomon, Interaction Effect
